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Excerpt from Journal
Office of Legislative Counsel
Tuesday - 31 January 1967

(Confidential - JSW) Met with Senator Gore and William Bader (Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee staff). I inquired of the Senator the content he wished covered in the briefing scheduled for Friday afternoon at 2:30. The Senator stated he wanted the full picture of the Soviet threat covering, of course, the ABM situation, delivery capabilities, missiles, aircraft, and submarines. He also wanted some comment on the overall R&D effort as we saw it. He stated he would like some discussion of the political intentions of the Soviet Union. He would also like a few words on the Soviet economy in terms of their ability to support their military efforts. He then stated he would like basically the same information on Communist China. He also indicated he would like some discussion on the capability and likelihood of other countries developing nuclear weapons; as he put it, the proliferation program. He specifically referred to the possibility of an agreement, either formal or informal, between the Soviets and the U. S. on not deploying an ABM system. He would like discussion on our ability to detect compliance with such an agreement. There was also mentioned the point of whether or not we could detect a nuclear weapon in an orbiting satellite, i. e., violation of the new space treaty. Mr. Bader advised later that he thought it likely, in view of the Senator's interest, questions might be raised about BW and CW. The Senator's present plans for this series call for either Rusk or Katzenbach from State, Vance from DOD, and also John Foster and William Foster from ACTA.

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cc:

Mr. Duckett

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MEMORANDUM

**SUBJECT: Senator Gore's Comments - Senate Foreign Relations
Committee - 30 January 1967**

1. Senator Gore, in the course of Kennan's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 30 January 1967 in laying the groundwork for a very general question on Sino-U. S. relations, stated:

"Yes. I concur in your view in that respect. I was only laying a predicate with respect to the time element. The United States is advised, as I understand it, that the Soviet Union is proceeding to deploy an ABM system in and around Moscow, whatever these terms mean with respect to distance, and in perhaps 26 other areas."

2. In speaking to the Senator about this and a news broadcast which apparently indicated that the Administration had issued a denial, the Senator stated that he believed his statement was not inconsistent with a part of Secretary McNamara's posture statement released on 26 January 1967 which says as follows:

"We have been aware for many years that the Soviets have been working on an anti-ballistic missile defense system, just as we have been. After a series of abortive starts, it now appears that the Soviets are deploying such a system (using the "GALOSH" missile, publicly displayed in 1964) around Moscow. They are also deploying another type of defensive system elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but the weight of the evidence at this time suggests that this system is not intended primarily for anti-ballistic missile defense. However, knowing what we do about past Soviet predilections for defense systems a/, we must, for the time being, plan our forces on the assumption that they will have deployed some sort of an ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970s."

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3. No one had communicated with the Senator or his office from the Administration on this morning. Core heard the broadcast but his Administrative Assistant had and he stated that no specific department or person was named in the broadcast. As of six o'clock on 31 January, [redacted] has been unable to locate anyone in the Executive Branch who knew about such a statement and has found no ticker items on it.

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a/ "The Soviets for more than a decade have spent substantially more on air defense against strategic bombers than has the U. S. But if our Strategic Air Command is correct in its judgment that a very high proportion of the U. S. incoming bombers could penetrate the Soviet defenses and reach their targets, and I have no reason to dispute it, then we must conclude that the bulk of these Soviet expenditures has been wasted."